Lingnan University

Digital Commons @ Lingnan University
staff_fulltext
4-26-2018

A new welfare regime in the making? Paternalistic welfare
pragmatism in China
Ka Ho MOK
Jiwei QIAN
National University of Singapore

Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.ln.edu.hk/staff_fulltext

Recommended Citation
MOK, Ka Ho and QIAN, Jiwei, "A new welfare regime in the making? Paternalistic welfare pragmatism in
China" (2018). staff_fulltext. 1.
https://commons.ln.edu.hk/staff_fulltext/1

This Journal article is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ Lingnan University. It has
been accepted for inclusion in staff_fulltext by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Lingnan
University.

Journal of European Social Policy, Forthcoming

A New Welfare Regime in the Making?
Paternalistic Welfare Pragmatism in China
Ka Ho Moka and Jiwei Qianb

a

Professor, Department of Sociology and Social Policy, Lingnan University

8 Castle Peak Road, Fu Tei, N.T., Hong Kong
Telephone: 852 26168288
E-mail: kahomok@LN.edu.hk

b

Research Fellow, East Asian Institute, National University of Singapore

469 Bukit Timah Road, Singapore 259756
Telephone: 65-6516-4178
E-mail: jiwei.qian@nus.edu.sg

Abstract
Since 2003, the Chinese government has been increasing its social expenditure and initiated
new social welfare programmes to provide universal social protection and meet welfare needs.
This article uses the wider socio-economic and socio-political contexts to critically examine
whether there is a new welfare regime on the rise in China, with a particular reference to
whether the increase in social expenditure has really marked a new welfare philosophy or
prompted the transformation of China into a protective welfare regime. By analysing
prefecture-level data for government expenditures in education, health, social security and
assistance programmes, we show a continuation of the Chinese welfare regime in
‘paternalistic welfare pragmatism’ for two reasons. First, government social expenditures are
set on the basis of the prefecture -level government’s fiscal capacity. Second, variations of
welfare programmes are associated with the dichotomy between the urban formal and
informal sectors.
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Introduction: Welfare Regime Debates in Asia

The discussion on welfare regimes and welfare state ideal types continues to dominate
comparative social policy analysis, although the focus of the debate has considerably
shifted since the publication of Esping-Andersen’s ground-breaking book, The Three
Worlds of Welfare Capitalism in 1990. Such discourse shift was prompted by both
theoretical and empirical concerns raised by comparative social policy scholars as a
result of the general internationalisation of social policy research agendas within the
academia (for example, Abrahamson, 1999; Hwang, 2011; Lin and Yi, 2013). Debates
over the most appropriate indicators (Kühner, 2007; Clasen and Sigel, 2007) and
methods (Hudson and Kühner, 2010; Kühner, 2015) continued. The desire to expand
the scope of the debate to encompass nations and regions excluded in
Esping-Andersen’s initial study of 18 high-income Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development (OECD) states is particularly strong (Hudson and
Kühner, 2012; Yang, 2013; Ahn and Lee, 2013).
The largest body of work in this regard has focused mainly on East Asia. The
debate regarding an “East Asian” model has persisted since the early 1990s. The
earliest critiques of Esping-Andersen’s typology pointed out a potential mismatch
between his ideal types and the foundations of welfare systems in the region (Jones,
1993; Goodman et al., 1998), wherein governments have emphasised economic
2

development over social policy. Since then, a substantial body of literature has been
developed, including Holliday (2000; 2005) and Kwon and Holliday (2007), both of
whom challenged Esping-Andersen’s typology. According to Holliday (2000), East
Asian cases are “impossible to place in Esping-Andersen’s framework” (Holliday,
2000, p. 711) because the “productivist” world of welfare existed in the region simply
due to low social spending.
Although China is not considered as a case of “productivist welfare capitalism”
in East Asia (Holiday, 2000), the country displays several features of the East Asian
welfare states (Peng and Wong, 2010; Mok and Hudson, 2014). For example, China
had low government spending on social programmes, and many of its social
programmes were not redistributive (Peng and Wong, 2010; Liu, Liu and, Huang,
2015).
Aside from the commonalities, one important distinction between China and East
Asian Welfare States is apparent. Compared to other countries in East Asia, regional
variations of social programme design and implementation are very significant in
China given the huge geography and diversity in practices commonly found in the
country, particularly when local governments are responsible for implementing the
policies issued by the central government. More specifically, welfare regionalism in
China is closely related to the political will of the local governments, as well as their
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fiscal capability and policy implementation capacity. Welfare regionalism is also
affected by the interplay among different stakeholders (i.e., work units, employees,
and local governments), which are often related to the legacy of the occupation-based
welfare system in the central planning era (Mok and Wu, 2013; Chan and Ngok,
2016).
Under the policy guideline of “building a harmonious society” in 2003, the
Chinese government began prioritizing two aspects of social policy reform. First, new
programmes for urban and rural residents, flexibly employed, peasants and migrant
worker were initiated. These new social programmes included pension and health
insurance schemes for rural and urban residents.
Second, the Chinese government shifted its expenditure emphasis toward social
policy, appropriating a substantially greater public funding for social programmes.
The government expenditure on social security and social assistance, education, and
health increased by 21.4% annually while nominal GDP growth was about 15%
between 2003 and 2013 (MOF, various years).
The present article sets out against the wider socio-economic and socio-political
environment briefly outlined above to analyse the extent to which the recent round of
social policy reform suggests that a new welfare regime is emerging in China. The
central research question of this study is as follows: is there any evidence showing the
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development of a new welfare regime with a fundamentally new philosophy and
governance measures in welfare provision in China?
While the Chinese government has initiated new social programmes targeting for
universal coverage of social protection and increased social expenditure substantially
since 2003, we argue that the welfare regime with strong productivist orientation
persists for two reasons. First, welfare policy implementation varies by region, and
such variations can generally be explained by local fiscal capacity (i.e., being
“pragmatic” in social spending with financial caution). Second, the legacy of
occupation-based welfare regime remains significant as social spending tend to be
targeted toward employees in the local formal sector (i.e. “paternalistic” governance).
By using the prefecture-level data for major government social expenditures on
education, health, social assistance, social security and employment between 2003
and 2012, we particularly provide empirical evidence of the persistence of the welfare
regime in China, even though the Chinese government has recently increased its
welfare provision. This article contributes to the welfare regime debate by
highlighting how the political economy in general and the central–local relations
resulted in a pragmatic and paternalistic welfare state in China.

5

Welfare Policies in China in the Context of the “Productivist” World of Welfare
Most East Asian economies have invested heavily in education, health care, and
workfare because most of these economies are “anti-welfare” that perceive social
policy as a tool to enhance productivity (Walker and Wong, 2005). Although these
Asian countries present good social outcomes in terms of health, education, and
equality indicators, they are generally marked by segmented and underdeveloped
welfare programmes (Midgley and Tang, 2009). Employing a fuzzy set analysis of 29
countries covered in recent data published by the Asian Development Bank (2013),
Kunher (2015) found that “the absence of strong income protection is most clearly
linked to low human development at the macro-level; high education investment is
linked to high income inequality if government fails to invest in employment and
income protection or employment protection and training” (p. 151).
The Chinese welfare regime displayed several features of the East Asian welfare
states before the 2000’s. First, China had low government spending on social
programmes.

Second, many of its social programmes were not redistributive (Peng

and Wong, 2010; Liu, Liu and Huang, 2015). However, different from many East
Asian welfare states, China’s pre-2003 productive welfare regime has a distinct
feature: welfare policies varied across different parts of the country. Local
governments set the terms, such as coverage and benefit levels, for the social
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programmes. In addition, most social insurances in China were designed based on the
local conditions for the urban formal sector before 2003. In East Asian welfare states
such as Japan, Korea and Taiwan, the eligibility of the social insurances had been
expanded from workers in selected occupations to workers in all occupations as well
as self-employed (Peng and Wong, 2010).
Recent analyses of the growing diversity of welfare provision from a welfare mix
perspective indicate that the central government plays a minor role in welfare
provision, with most responsibility shared by other sectors, including the local
government, the market, the family, and social organisations (Schwartz and Shieh,
2009; Mok, 2016).
More importantly, we must note that the central government in China delegated
the responsibility for welfare provision and social protection to local governments
since the 1980s (Leung and Xu, 2015). Economic and administrative decentralisation
has empowered local governments to charge with responsibility for the economic
growth, as well as the management of social insurance and social service delivery.
Local government has large expenditure responsibilities (over 70 percent of the total
government expenditure between 2003 and 2013 (MOF, various years). Also, social
programmes were initiated based on occupation and employment status in different
localities. Policies of social insurances, such as pension schemes and social health
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insurance, were designed for the public sector and urban formal sector workers
(Ringen and Ngok, 2013; Frazier, 2014). For example, major social insurance
schemes, including the basic pension scheme, basic urban employee health insurance
and unemployment insurance, were initiated in the 1990s to provide social protection
for state-owned enterprise workers (Ringen and Ngok, 2013).
More specifically, local governments are actively adapting policies and measures
in social welfare provision to meet their particular social and economic needs (Leung
and Xu, 2015). This decentralised approach to welfare development inevitably led to
regional disparities and welfare variations in China. As economic and social
development presents continued regional inequalities, Cook (2011) found that “a more
complex geography of welfare had emerged with strong regional or local features”
and that the capacity of local governments “to respond to this more complex welfare
geography through public action depended to a large extent on the capacity, resources
and incentives of the local state” (p. 215). Carrillo and Duckett (2011) examined
welfare development in China and observed that even though the central government
still defines the national welfare policy framework, local governments are given
increased discretion to adapt and adjust policies to meet local welfare needs (see also
Shi, 2009).
In short, the major reason for the disparity between the policy target set by the
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central government and the outcomes of policy implementation is closely associated
with welfare regionalism, by which local governments are primarily responsible for
welfare provision, whereas the central government maintains a minimal level of social
protection (Mok and Wu, 2013; Ngok, 2013; OECD, 2013). In principle, given that
local governments always possess enhanced local knowledge and understanding of
the needs of local residents, they are well-positioned to allocate resources to meet
these social and welfare needs. Nonetheless, the initiative of local governments to
actively promote social protection depends on how local bureaucrats respond to
decentralisation (see Mok and Wu, 2013; Ngok and Huang, 2014; Leung and Xu,
2015).
In this context, it was observed that social policies in China were not
implemented on the basis of citizens’ social and welfare needs. Recent studies on the
“welfare citizenship” in China argued that “social rights” and “rights to social welfare”
have not been well embedded in society despite the heightened welfare expectations
of citizens (Mok and Huang, 2013). Cook, from the United Nations Research Institute
for Social Development, declared that China’s social policies must better respond to
the changing needs of society and the specific needs of different social groups (Cook,
2011).

9

A Discontinuation of the Chinese Welfare Regime?
The outbreak of SARS in 2003 exposed the underdevelopment of the Chinese welfare
system. The marketisation and privatisation of social welfare provision and social
service delivery resulted in a widened income gap and increased social inequality
(Ngok and Huang, 2014). Since 2003, the Chinese government attempted to expand
its social welfare programmes in response to calls for “social cohesion” by increasing
its social expenditure and encouraging local governments to increase social welfare
programme inputs in order to meet the changing welfare demands of its citizens (Mok
and Ku, 2010; Leung and Xu, 2015).
New social insurance programmes, including pension and health insurance that
cover rural and urban residents, have been initiated since 2003. Pensions for urban
and rural residents were initiated in 2011 and 2009, respectively. Health insurances
for rural and urban residents were established in 2004 and 2006, respectively.
The ratio of total government expenditure on social security and social assistance,
education, and health (i.e., the three key social policy areas in China) to GDP, which
was 4.69 percent in 2003, increased to 7.82 percent in 2013 (MOF, various years).
This growth was remarkable, as it represented more than three percentage points of
GDP within 10 years at a time when the GDP itself was increasing rapidly. As the
total amount of government social expenditure steadily increased, the central
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government assumed greater fiscal responsibility. From 2003 to 2013, the central
government spending on social security and employment, education and health
increased from RMB 50.1 to 182.4 billion, representing an increase of over 3.5 times
in nominal terms (MOF, various years). In 2013, the total money (including transfers)
from central government spending on education, health care, and social security and
employment accounted for 17.6, 31.3, and 45.3 percent of the total government
expenditure on each of these policy areas (MOF, various years), respectively.
In short, in China, the provision of universal social protection coverage has
become an important policy target for policymakers at the central level. Compared to
the “Productivist” welfare regime, a universal coverage of social protection can play a
much more useful role in improving social cohesion and reducing economic inequality.
To achieve the target of universal coverage of social protection, the central government
has initiated social insurances to cover a wider basis of Chinese citizens and increased
social spending significantly to finance new social programmes.
The social policy expansion in China is analysed given this context, particularly
the increasing role of the central government in social welfare provision, which
prompted some researchers to believe that China experienced a significant paradigm
shift in welfare regime and is moving toward a protectionist orientation (Choi, 2012).
Comparing the social welfare expansions and transformations in China and South
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Korea, Han and Kim (2014) argued that China has reached a phase of social
protection with “a fundamental shift of value orientation of social welfare” by
“transforming from the selective welfare of liberalism to the institutional welfare of
universalism” (p.88).
However, in view of the shared fiscal responsibilities between the central and
local governments, several researchers have argued that even though the Chinese
government increased its welfare expenditure and expanded its welfare provision
scope, the Chinese welfare state remains a productive welfare regime because local
governments continue to prioritise economic growth over welfare protection
improvement (Leung and Xu, 2015; Mok, 2016; Qian and Mok, 2016). For example,
it was argued that the outcomes of social policies were less significant and measurable
than economic outcomes when evaluating local officials (Gao, 2015). In this case,
local officials lacked the incentive to strive for social policy implementation. For
example, Qian and Mok (2016) report that the coordination among (local) government
departments at in implementing social programmes was ineffective.
In the following part, we will critically examine the central research question: is
there any evidence showing the development of a new welfare regime in China?

Testing the Continuation of the Welfare Regime
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To test whether there is a continuation of the welfare regime with a strong productivist
orientation, this paper analyses the pattern of local government social spending and its
relation to the size of the formal sector. Specifically, the nationwide data in both rural
and urban areas are used to elucidate the degree to which the formal/informal
dichotomy is relevant in the Chinese welfare regime. Government social expenditure,
which plays a key role in redistributing resources across different social and economic
groups, is considered as one of the most important measurements for understanding
the types of welfare regimes (Prasad, 2016). In China’s case, government social
expenditure is the most important index to measure the welfare regime for two
reasons.
First, government social expenditure is a measure of the benefit level of welfare
policy provision. While the benefit level of social programmes in a locality can be
determined by many social and economic factors, government social expenditure is
still a useful index to measure how “deep” of the coverage of welfare policies (i.e.
benefit level). For instance, a larger amount of government subsidy is likely to be
associated with a higher reimbursement rate of social insurance. The ratio between
fiscal subsidy and individual premium contribution in Shanghai’s urban resident
health insurance was about 7.4 in 2016, much higher than the national average (i.e.

13

about 4)1. The benefit of social health insurance in Shanghai is likely to be higher than
the national average. Similarly, government social expenditure is also related to the
quality of the service provision. For example, government education expenditure per
student in primary schools in Beijing reached RMB19,000 while the number was
RMB2,700 in Henan, a central province in China, in 2014.2 The amount of fiscal
spending is positively associated with the size of physical and non-physical inputs for
primary education, which are indicators of the quality of primary education students
receive.
Second, government social expenditure is crucial also in measuring the
increasing coverage/enrollment rate of social insurances. In particular, recently
initiated pension and health insurances targeted toward urban and rural residents are
highly subsidized by the government budget. For example, in 2015, the government
subsidized RMB 380 out of the RMB 500 per enrollee for the premium of rural health
insurance3.
The persistence of the welfare regime in China is tested in two aspects: first,
whether the design and implementation of welfare policies still vary by local’s
economic condition; and second, whether the benefit level and coverage of welfare
1

http://finance.qq.com/a/20160111/006887.htm (accessed 9 July 2017).
China Educational Finance Statistical Yearbook 2014.
3
See an official document about rural health insurance policy, downloadable from
http://www.nhfpc.gov.cn/jws/s3581sg/201501/98d95186d494472e8d4ae8fa60e9efc5.shtml accessed
January 12, 2017.
2
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policies are still set on the basis of local employment and occupation structure. To test
these two aspects of the welfare regionalism in China, the following data analysis
identifies the determinants of government social expenditures, including government
expenditure on education, health, social assistance, and social security and
unemployment.
Two major dimensions of the welfare regime are evaluated. First, the fiscal
capacity of a prefecture is a major determinant of the pragmatism of welfare policies. If
the local fiscal capacity is critical for these social expenditures, welfare policies vary
with local economic conditions. Second, the variations of the determinants in different
social expenditures can reveal the nature of the welfare regime. Education and health
care services are two basic public services accessed by all local residents. In contrast,
social assistance programmes offer financial protection for disadvantaged urban groups,
such as the urban elderly, the unemployed, and low-income workers (e.g., workers in
the informal sector). If expected variations are apparent in the social expenditures in
terms of the formal–informal sector dichotomy, then variations of welfare policies
based on local occupation and employment structure are plausible.

Formal and Informal Sectors in China
China’s informal sector can be defined in two ways. First, informal employment can
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be defined by the type of labour contract (i.e., individuals without written
employment contracts are defined as informal employees) (Zuo, 2013). Second, the
urban informal sector can be defined by enterprise registration types. According to
Ghose (2005), the formal sector in China includes state-owned enterprises, collectively
owned

enterprises,

limited

liability

companies,

shareholding

corporations,

foreign-owned companies, and joint ventures; in comparison, the urban informal sector
includes registered small-scale private enterprises and individual businesses.
In view of the data limitations, the types of labour contracts for workers are
unavailable at the city/prefecture level. As such, this paper uses the second definition,
in which the informal sector workers are those who work in registered small-scale
private enterprises and individual businesses. This definition, which is based on
enterprise type, is relevant in China’s context with regard to the changes in the
welfare regime, because small-scale private enterprises and individual businesses are
given less importance by the local government than formal sector firms in terms of the
contribution to the local fiscal budget. Although workers from small-scale private
enterprises and individual businesses accounted for 44 percent of the urban workers in
20134, the tax revenue from registered small-scale private enterprises and individual
businesses accounted for only 15 percent of the total tax revenue from firms in that

4

See China Statistical Yearbook 2014.
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year (State Administration of Taxation, 2014).

Hypotheses
Based on the preceding analysis, the following three hypotheses will be tested.
Hypothesis 1: Government social spending is higher in a prefecture with a larger
formal sector.
This hypothesis addresses the regional variations of welfare policy in local
economic conditions. The formal sector workers and their family members
are supposed to be protected financially by the government under the pre-2003 welfare
regime. The local government may spend more on social programmes in a prefecture
with a larger formal sector.

Hypothesis 2: Government social spending is higher in a prefecture with a larger fiscal
capacity.
This hypothesis is associated with the regional variations in local economic
conditions. Under the pre-2003 welfare regime, prefectures with a larger fiscal
capacity are likely to incur higher social spending per capita, whereas cities with tighter
fiscal conditions will spend less. In other words, the benefit level of welfare
programmes is higher in a prefecture with a larger fiscal capacity.
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Hypothesis 3: Government social spending in a prefecture increases with the average
salary of workers in the formal sector.
This hypothesis is derived from regional variations in local economic conditions
as well as occupational structure. For a number of social programmes, such as health
and unemployment insurances, the coverage and the benefit levels are set based on the
income of formal sector workers.

Data
Our dataset consists of data from 282 prefecture cities in China. The data were mainly
collected from the China City Statistical Yearbooks and the China Premium Database
(CEIC)5. Prefecture-level data were used because welfare policies in China are usually
determined and implemented by the prefecture-level government. The time span of the
dataset spanned between 2003 and 2012. A prefecture consists of both urban and rural
areas, and the prefecture-level data reported in the city statistical yearbooks also
included data for rural residents.
The dataset used in this study is representative of nationwide social programs
because the population in the prefectures included in the dataset covers the majority of
5

See the official webpage of the database at
https://www.ceicdata.com/en/countries/china, accessed January 12, 2017.
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the population in China. For example, in 2012, the dataset included 266 prefectures,
and the total population was more than 1.14 billion or 85% of the total Chinese
population. However, megacities such as Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, and
Chongqing are not included in our dataset, because these are considered province-level
units, and their population sizes are considerably and fiscally larger than that of most of
the other cities.

Variables
All variables and their definitions are listed in Table 1.
<Insert Table 1 approximately here>

To verify our hypotheses, we used three major types of social expenditures,
namely, government health, government education, and social assistance expenditures,
which were redefined as social security and employment expenditures in 2007.
Government education expenditures between 2003 and 2012 are analysed in this
paper. Government education expenditure includes the spending on primary, secondary,
and higher education. Government health expenditure includes expenditure on public
health, public hospitals, and clinics in addition to government subsidies for social
health insurance. Health expenditures paid by social health insurance is not part of
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government health expenditure. The local (prefecture) government health expenditure
between 2007 and 2012 is included in our dataset. In view of the data source limitations,
we do not have access to the data on government health expenditures prior to 2007.
Social assistance expenditure includes spending on disaster relief, social
assistance for poor households and the disabled, and minimum livelihood guarantees.
Owing to the changes in statistical scope, only four years of data were available for
social assistance (between 2003 and 2006). The statistical scope was adjusted in 2007,
and government social assistance and social security expenditures were combined into
a single category (Wang and Long, 2011). Social security and employment expenditure
includes social assistance expenditures, as well as prefecture-level government
expenditures on social security subsidiary expenses, for retired persons in government
departments, and for employment service 6 . The dataset includes prefecture-level
government social security and employment expenditures between 2007 and 2012.
The number of hospital beds, the unemployment rate, and the number of teachers
in primary schools, secondary schools, and universities per 1,000 residents were also
used in the data analyses. Urbanisation rate, defined as the proportion of urban area
residents in the total population in a prefecture, was also included as a control
variable.
6

See China Civil Affairs Statistical Yearbook 2014.
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We also included a variable “dependency ratio”, which is defined as the ratio of
the number of residents to the labour force in a prefecture. A higher dependency ratio
indicates that a higher proportion of people in the prefecture are not participating in
the labour market. This variable served as a proxy measurement for the demand for
social programmes in that prefecture because many social expenditures are targeted for
people outside the labour force, such as the elderly (e.g., higher health expenditure), the
young (e.g., higher education expenditure), and the unemployed and flexibly employed
(e.g., higher social assistance expenditure).
The variables of expenditures, revenue, GDP, and income per capita were deflated
by the Consumer Price Index to capture the price changes. The descriptive statistics for
all variables are listed in Table 2.
<Insert Table 2 approximately here>

Model
We estimate the following model:
𝑆𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙_𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟_𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛿𝐹𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑙_𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑖,𝑡 +
+𝛾𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙_𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟_𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜌𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜔𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖,𝑡

(1)

where 𝛽, 𝛾, 𝜌, and 𝛿 are the parameters for the corresponding variables in the model.
𝑋𝑖,𝑡 corresponds to the covariates including GDP per capita, urbanisation rate,
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unemployment rate, hospital beds per 1,000 people, number of teachers in various
school levels, and dependency ratio.
𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙_𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟_𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 refers to the ratios of the number of employees in the
formal and informal sectors in prefecture i in year t. Therefore, this variable refers to
the size of the formal sector in relation to the informal sector. In this case, with regard
to the expenditure on social assistance, 𝛽 should be negative for social assistance
expenditure because the informal sector workers are more likely to be affected by
adverse financial shocks.
𝐹𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑙_𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑖,𝑡 refers to the fiscal revenue per capita in prefecture i in year t.
𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙_𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟_𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖,𝑡 denotes the average salary of employees in the formal
sector. µ𝑖 denotes prefecture-specific effects. 𝜔𝑡 corresponds to the year dummy
variables, with 𝑒𝑖,𝑡 defined as the error term. To address the concerns on the error
term correlations, we use clustered standard errors at the prefecture-level.

Results
The regression results are shown in Table 3.
<Insert Table 3 approximately here>

Hypothesis 2 is strongly supported by all models (i.e., Columns (1)–(4)).
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Government expenditures on education, health, social assistance, and social security
and employment are positively and significantly associated with the fiscal capacity of
the local government (i.e., fiscal revenue per capita). A prefecture government with a
higher fiscal capacity is more likely to spend more on social programmes, thereby
supporting the pragmatic welfare state hypothesis that the benefit level of social
programmes and the quality of public services are likely to be adjusted based on the
local fiscal capacity.
As expected, given the importance of education expenditure in the government
budget, fiscal revenue exerted a stronger effect on government education expenditure
than on other social expenditures. Every RMB 1,000 increase in fiscal revenue per
capita is associated with an increase in government education and health expenditures
per capita by about RMB 112 and 29, respectively (i.e., Columns (1) and (2)). Similarly,
every RMB 1,000 increase in fiscal revenue per capita is associated with an increase in
government social security and employment expenditure and in social assistance
expenditure per capita by RMB 54 and 8, respectively (i.e., Columns (3) and (4)).
The results for Hypothesis 1 are mixed. Government education expenditure is
positively and statistically associated with the size of the formal sector. A 1 percent
increase in the size of the formal sector causes an additional 0.89 percent (0.89, as
shown in column (1)) allocated for government education expenditure per capita. The
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magnitude of the formal sector size effect is not large but is statistically significant.
No statistical significance was observed between the size of the formal
sector and the government health expenditure per capita (i.e., Column (2)). This result
is conceivable because the health expenditure for workers in the formal sector is
mainly covered by social health insurances (i.e., Basic Urban Employee Medical
Insurances). Given that Basic Urban Employee Medical Insurances are financed by
contributions from both employers and employees, the expenditures from these social
health insurances were not considered part of government health expenditure.
Compared with social health insurance expenditures, government health expenditure
plays a minor role in financially protecting the urban formal sector. For example, in
2010, the per-capita expenditure on Basic Urban Employee Medical Insurance, which
mainly covers the health expenditure of urban formal sector workers, was 13 times the
summed per-capita expenditure of rural health insurance and urban resident
expenditure, which mainly covers the health insurance of urban informal sector
workers (Huang, 2014). This argument was also supported by the negative and
significant “dependency” ratio in Column (2). The government health expenditure per
capita increased with the size of the labour force, suggesting that the
occupation-based welfare system may be still present.
The coefficient of the formal sector size in Columns (3) and (4) is also not
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statistically significant. The 𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙_𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟_𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 in the regression model is defined
as the ratio of the numbers of employees in the formal and informal sectors. The
regression results imply that the relative size of the informal sector is not associated
with the government expenditure on social assistance programmes and the
expenditure on social security and employment. Although the majority of social
assistance recipients are informal sector workers and their family members, the social
assistance budget has not been allocated based on the size of the informal sector.
Hypothesis 3 is supported by the regression results. A higher average salary for
the workers in the formal sector is positively and significantly associated with
government

education

and

health

expenditures

(i.e.,

the

coefficient

of

𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙_𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟_𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒) in Columns (1) and (2)). In other words, government
spending on education and health increased with the average salary in the formal
sector. Every RMB 1,000 increase in the average salary in the formal sector
corresponded to an increase of RMB 11 and 6 in government education and health
expenditure per capita, respectively. However, government expenditures on social
assistances and social security are not adjusted with the salary of workers in the
formal sector (Columns (3) and (4)).
The urbanisation rate is statistically significant in Columns (1) and (2), suggesting
that the government expenditures on education and health are likely to be higher in a
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prefecture with a higher urbanisation rate. An increase of 1 percent in urbanisation rate
is associated with an increase of RMB 129–182 in government expenditure per capita
in these policy areas. In other words, urban areas are still receiving a higher proportion
of government resources in social policy areas.
Interestingly, the unemployment rate is not significant for all government social
expenditures. This result is also consistent with Hypothesis 3 wherein the policies of
welfare programs are designed based on the economic conditions in the formal sector.
Social expenditures do not vary with the number of the registered unemployed, which
are not part of the formal sector.

Discussion: Pragmatic and Paternalistic Welfare Paradigm in China
Productive welfarism has not been limited to a handful of East Asian countries
(Hwang, 2011). Researchers all over the world with different perspectives have
argued that in response to globalisation, some high-income states have shifted their
social policies toward a supporting and subjugated role with respect to economic
policy (for example, Cerny and Evans, 1999; Evans and Cerny, 2003; Horsfall, 2010).
Confronted with declining economic growth and gradually dismantling traditional
income protections, several European countries are now facing the harsh reality to
balance economic growth and increasing fiscal pressure for social protection. In the
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struggle to survive amid unmanageable welfare burdens and stagnating economic
growth, people are clamouring to replace the welfare state with a competition state to
boost economic competitiveness (Hudson and Kuhner, 2014).
Realizing the importance of maintaining social stability and harmony in order to
assert its political legitimacy in the post-2003 era, the Chinese policymakers also had
made serious attempts to translate and adapt the foreign welfare models and ideas to the
Chinese context. In particular, “universalism”, which is fundamental of Western
welfare states, is embraced by the policymakers in China. New social programmes
have been initiated since 2003 to achieve the policy target of universal coverage of
social protection. Also, government spending on social welfare has substantially
increased since 2003 after the expansion of social insurances.
However, the present study shows that China has yet to demonstrate a
fundamental paradigm shift in welfare philosophy and welfare regime in recent years.
The Chinese government, particularly the local government, still prioritises economic
growth, while offering more social programs creates a more socially stable
environment to support economic growth. In other words, social policies are
implemented based on the rationale of economic development rather than citizens’
social and welfare needs.
Our findings presented above have clearly suggested there is a significant
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disparity between the policy target to improve “social cohesion” and policy
implementation in welfare provision. First, government social expenditures, which
determine the coverage and the benefit levels of welfare policies, are set based on
local fiscal conditions. Second, as in the pre-2003 welfare regime, variations in
government social spending after 2003 are still associated with the dichotomy
between the local formal and informal sectors. The economic condition and the size of
the formal sector are key determinants of government education and health
expenditure. In addition, the size of the informal sector is irrelevant for social
assistance programmes targeted at the informal sector. Furthermore, similar to the
pre-2003 welfare regime, government social expenditure after 2003 is increasing with
the proportion of labour force in the local population.
Welfare regionalism, which resulted in variations in welfare protection and social
policy provision across different parts of the country, is supported by the data analysis
results in this study. While receiving the policy instructions given by the central
government, the local government is the major decision maker in setting the policies of
social programmes, including the benefit level and the coverage.
Social welfare provisions in China are likely to be used as policy instruments by
the Chinese government in particular local governments to serve both pragmatic and
paternalistic purposes, which may imply a continuation of the welfare regime after
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2003.
First, welfare policies are implemented pragmatically. The local fiscal capacity
to deliver social programmes is critical in social policy implementation (Wong and
Bird, 2008). Social programme policies, such as the benefit level and coverage, are set
at the discretion of the local government (Li, 2011). Even if the policymakers at the
central level are intent on providing universal social welfare coverage, local
governments are more concerned about economic growth and fiscal resource
allocation for productive purposes (Li and Zhou, 2005; Xu, 2011). Thus, local
governments may allocate social spending according to its fiscal capacity (i.e.,
observing financial viability and sustainability) rather than welfare needs. A larger
fiscal capacity of a local government corresponds to a larger budget for social
expenditure allocation if local authorities believe that such an undertaking will
enhance governance and political legitimacy.
Welfare policies are implemented pragmatically also because the Chinese (local)
government rides over the local (making sure social welfare expansion would not
jeopardize economic growth) and global (welfare expansion to protect social right)
worlds when initiating social programmes (Liu and Leisering, 2017). For example, the
introduction of social assistance programme, Minimum Living Standard Scheme
(MLSS), with regional variations clearly demonstrated how the Chinese welfare regime
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is pragmatic. As Leisering, Liu and ten Brink (2017) argued, the Chinese government,
instead of acting as a passive recipient of foreign welfare models and practices, has
performed as creative agents in experimenting social assistance programmes across
different parts of the country in addressing the intensified income gap and regional
disparities through synthesizing disparate ideas, forging a Chinese model of social
assistance embracing global value of “universalism”, which is fundamental of Western
welfare states. However, the Chinese government well recognizes the financial
implications and complexity of policy implementation against the reality of wide
regional variations, the government therefore honours the right to social assistance with
a means test in order not to over burden the system. Also, the benefit level and coverage
of the social assistance programme are set to be contingent on local economic and
social conditions by the local government.
Second, welfare policies are also implemented in a paternalistic manner. China’s
welfare regime is not measured in terms of universal or citizen-based rights; rather,
welfare measurement involves occupational and sectorial divisions (Li, 2011; Ringen
and Ngok, 2013; Huang, 2014). One of the major policy targets for the local
government was protecting the interests of the formal sector, which contributed
increased tax revenues and exerted a much stronger political influence than the
informal sector (Cui, 2015). Given their strong intention to maintain social stability
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for further economic growth, local governments prioritise the economic stability of
the formal sector (particularly state-owned enterprises) by offering either preferential
treatment or a welfare package to accommodate their preferences (taking a
paternalistic role in governance).
Also, the welfare of local officials (i.e. appointment, promotion, etc.) highly
depends on the amount of fiscal revenue they can raise, which can be invested in
infrastructure development to promote economic growth (Xu, 2011; Gordon and Li,
2013). Local officials therefore have incentives to attract firms who can contribute a
large sum of tax revenue. Local government also have incentives to prevent firms
contributing a large tax revenue from relocating their economic activities elsewhere.
From this rationale, since the formal sector contributes the majority share of local tax
revenue, local government is likely to allocate a large amount of resources to urban
based and occupational based social programmes to accommodate the demand of the
formal sector. As suggested by this paper, social programme policies including
coverage and the benefit level were set by the local government based on the size and
economic conditions of the formal sector.
More specifically, the paternalism and pragmatism in China’s social policy
implementation are closely related to the local governments’ decisions on policy tools
and policy options in addressing the competing demands for economic growth and
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social protection, particularly when local bureaucrats prefer economic growth and
stability over social protection/social rights. Although the central government
possesses the political will to improve welfare provision for its citizens to promote
social harmony conducive to its leadership, local governments must balance economic
growth and social development by adopting welfare approaches tactically to address
the heightened welfare expectations (i.e., “pragmatic”) and manipulating different
forms of social welfare packages to meet local economic, social, and political needs
(i.e., “paternalistic”). In other words, welfare provision is a means to serve the market
economy to support economic growth rather than to support a fundamental paradigm
shift toward welfare provision that increases the rights and entitlements of citizens.

Conclusion
In conclusion, the call for building a harmonious society and the state’s strong
intention to make welfare protection a policy tool for social stability and regime
legitimation since 2003 have not fundamentally changed the welfare philosophy and
the welfare regime. Severely under the challenge of economic stagnation and
increasing influence of a globalizing economy, the welfare sovereignty of the
European Union (EU) member states has been gradually eroded by the force of a
single European market and the corresponding EU supranational intervention. An
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increasing number of EU member states are searching for methods to strike a balance
between the call for market liberalization to support efficiency gains and the
installation of regulatory framework to mitigate the negative consequences of market
liberalization (Scharpf, 1999; Leibfried, 2010). Obviously, the increasing influence of
a globalizing economy pressing for the maximization of profits with consistent efforts
to cut production costs would inevitably force governments worldwide to revisit their
strategies to untangle the tension between economic growth and welfare protection. It
is against such a political economy context that the notion of “competitive solidarity”
has evolved in Europe showing the shift from the emphasis on the protective
dimension of welfare toward productive dimension. This paradigm shift will
fundamentally change the logic of social security from providing significant weight to
redistribution based on social justice to enhance human capital building based on
economic competitiveness.
Closely watching what has happened in Europe, the Chinese government has
tactically walked with “different legs” when translating foreign welfare ideas and
practices into the local context that correspond to the diverse social, economic, and
political needs of localities/regions, leading to the pragmatic and paternalistic
approach of welfare provision and diverse practices / regional variations in welfare
protection across the country.
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Table 1: Definition of variables7
Variables

Definition

Time period

Education expenditure

Education expenditure per capita
(RMB)

2003-2012

Health expenditure

Health expenditure per capita
(RMB)

2007-2012

Social security and
employment expenditure

Social security and employment
expenditure per capita (RMB)8

2007-2012

Social assistance expenditure

Social assistance expenditure per
capita (RMB)

2003-2006

Formal sector size

Ratio of the number of employees 2003-2012
worked in the formal and informal
sector
Average salary for urban formal

2003-2012

Formal sector income

sector employees (,000 RMB)
2003-2012

Fiscal revenue

Fiscal revenue per capita (,000
RMB)
The ratio between the number of
local residents and labor forces
(including employees worked in

2003-2012

Dependency ratio

the formal and informal sector)

GDP per capita

GDP per capita (,000 RMB)

2003-2012
2007-2012

Hospital beds

Number of hospital beds per
1,000 people

2003-2012

Primary school teachers

Number of primary school
teachers per 1,000 people

2003-2012

Secondary school teachers

Number of Secondary school
teachers per 1,000 people

2003-2012

University teachers

Number of university teachers
per 1,000 people

2003-2012

Unemployment rate

Number of registered
unemployed per 1,000 people

7

All variables are prefecture level variables.
These expenditures include prefecture level government expenditure on retirees’ salary (in
administrative public service units), social assistances, employment service and fiscal subsidy for social
security.
8
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics

Variable
Education
expenditure
Health
expenditure

Observations

Mean

Std.
Dev.

Min

Max

2632

459.16

331.25

46.21

4385.21

1649

238.75

135.79

20.20

1795.02

1062

355.93

205.09

14.00

1454.78

1077

24.76

27.17

1.25

160.90

2632

2.11

3.73

0.16

158.83

2632

20.43

7.79

5.92

56.29

2632

1.41

1.65

0.07

16.14

2632

7.29

4.23

0.21

26.30

2632

21.00

16.47

1.87

145.01

2632

0.32

0.21

0.34

1

1673

3.33

1.39

0.12

30.63

2632

4.29

0.86

1.87

10.75

2632

3.84

0.69

1.47

8.19

2632

0.78

1.07

0.02

7.91

2632

34.84

20.13

0.88

315.88

Social security
and
employment
expenditure
Social
assistance
expenditure
Formal sector
size
Formal sector
income
Fiscal revenue
Dependency
ratio
GDP per capita
Urbanization
rate
Hospital beds
Primary school
teachers
Secondary
school teachers
University
teachers
Unemployment
rate
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Table 3: Regression results for the determinants of social expenditures
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

Education

Health

Social security

Social

expenditure

expenditure

and

assistance

employment

expenditure

expenditure
Formal sector

0.890**

-0.921

-0.983

0.00792

size

(0.317)

(0.945)

(1.444)

(0.0194)

11.48***

6.268**

0.862

0.589

(3.064)

(2.394)

(2.239)

(0.491)

112.2***

29.06**

35.41***

9.030***

(19.83)

(9.442)

(7.142)

(1.914)

-0.280

-5.119***

Formal sector
income

Fiscal revenue

Dependency
ratio

0.106
-6.378**

(1.781)

(1.161)

1.252

-0.297

0.681

0.232

(1.674)

(1.074)

(1.198)

(0.212)

Urbanization

129.1*

181.7*

266.6*

-1.383

rate

(53.74)

(77.50)

(133.2)

(21.07)

0.215

0.204

0.313

0.0105

(0.200)

(0.120)

(0.313)

(0.0446)

GDP per capita

Unemployment
rate

Hospital beds

(2.324)

(0.212)

2.450
(2.269)

Primary school
teachers

Secondary

13.90
(10.82)

78.63***

school teachers

(10.98)

University

-20.91

teachers

(17.54)
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Constant

-429.3***

-66.55**

126.9

2.593

(79.96)

(24.72)

(72.47)

(8.431)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Year Dummy

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

N

2632

1649

1062

1077

adj. R2

0.918

0.814

0.633

0.433

Prefecture fixed
effect

Clustered robust standard error at prefecture level in parentheses,

* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, ** p<0.001.
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